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Abstract
Homomorphic encryption is a particular type of encryption method that enables
computing over encrypted data. This has a wide range of real world ramifications
such as being able to blindly compute a search result sent to a remote server without
revealing its content.
In the first part of this thesis, we discuss how database search queries can be
made secure using a homomorphic encryption scheme based on the ideas of Gahi
et al. Gahi’s method is based on the integer-based fully homomorphic encryption
scheme proposed by Dijk et al. We propose a new database search scheme called the
Homomorphic Query Processing Scheme, which can be used with the ring-based fully
homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Braserski.
In the second part of this thesis, we discuss the cybersecurity of the smart electric
grid. Specifically, we use the Homomorphic Query Processing scheme to construct a
keyword search technique in the smart grid. Our work is based on the Public Key
ii
iii
Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) method introduced by Boneh et al. and a
Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption scheme proposed by Lo´pez-Alt et al.
A summary of the results of this thesis (specifically the Homomorphic Query
Processing Scheme) is published at the 14th Canadian Workshop on Information
Theory (CWIT) [39].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the advent of the digital era in the 1980s, there was a rapid growth in commu-
nication and networking all over the globe. This was followed by the trend of minia-
turization of digital equipment, and current standards allow us to use a smartphone
with the same computational power as the whole of NASA back in the 1970s [29].
The fast-moving trend of digitalization has enabled access of most services from dis-
tant locations. For example, a recent study shows that 74% of smartphone users
use a location based service (such as Google Maps) to find directions and other lo-
cation based information [48]. Moreover, the adaptation of these kind of services in
healthcare are becoming increasingly common with cloud-based health recording and
genomic data management tools such as Microsoft Health. However, the widespread
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adaptation of location-based services poses a threat to users because their personal
data, such as location, health records, and sometimes even genomic data, is shared
on the web without any guarantee of privacy.
The privacy of data sent via the web can be guaranteed if they are encrypted
before sending. However, encryption also makes server side computations impossible
unless the data center is provided with the decryption key. This problem can be
addressed by fully homomorphic Encryption schemes, which enable operations on
encrypted data such that, when decrypted, will output a corresponding plaintext.
1.1 Motivation
Existing database systems use various query processing technologies to process database
queries. For example most databases use Structured Query Language (SQL) to han-
dle user defined queries, whereas query processing schemes such as Java Persistence
Query Language (JPQL) is used by database administrators for programatically han-
dle database queries. The processing of database records by users as well as admin-
istrators is subjected to a wide range of privacy issues. On the part of the user, the
most common privacy concern is that queries they send could be viewed at the server
side. For example a query that is sent to a search engine could be viewed, stored
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or manipulated by a malicious party (i.e., a malicious database administrator) after
it is received by the server. This is a major privacy concern, and currently the only
practical solution that is being used is defining strict privacy laws that govern appro-
priate usage of user data. Cryptographic solutions that are being used can protect
data during trasmit, but once it reaches its destination, to process the queries the
data packets need to be decrypted. This is the main motivation of homomorphic
encryption. As we shall discuss homomorphic encryption can be used to prevent data
breaches during storing as well as during query operations.
This work attempts to improve upon a method proposed by Gahi et al. [19] to
homomorphically encrypt database queries. Their work specifically uses the DGHV
fully homomorphic encryption scheme [15]. The DGHV scheme operates on plaintext
bits separately, and thus Gahi’s method requires a large amount of computations
to perform even a simple operation such as integer multiplication. We propose an
alternative to Gahi’s method, which we call Homomorphic Query Processing. Our
method is not restricted to the DGHV scheme and can be used with more modern
fully homomorphic encryption schemes. For example, using our Homomorphic Query
Processing technique with the more recent ring based fully homomorphic encryption
scheme proposed by Braserski et al. [12], which work on blocks of data (such as
integers) rather than single bits (as in Gahi’s scheme), the number of computations
1.2 Contribution and Organization 4
can be greatly reduced.
In addition to this goal, we also look at recent approaches in integrating homomor-
phic encryption schemes for aggregating measurements in the smart grid. The “smart
electric grid” can be defined as the next generation electric grid network that uses
information technology to deliver electricity efficiently, reliably, and securely. Specif-
ically we summarize the methods introduced by Garcia [21], Kursawe [31], Erkin [16]
and A´cs [3]. We then discuss methods of processing queries over encrypted data in
the smart grid and propose a new keyword search scheme based on our Homomorphic
Query Processing method. The proposed method also uses Public Key Encryption
with Keyword Search (PEKS), introduced by Boneh et al. [9], and Multi-Key Ho-
momorphic Encryption introduced by Lo´pez-Alt et al [33]. This scheme can be used
along with the previously mentioned aggregating schemes to make smart meter data
encrypted as well as queryable. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the
challenges faced by each proposed protocol and future research directions.
1.2 Contribution and Organization
In the first part of this thesis, we focus on improving a specific database query pro-
tocol suggested by Gahi et al [19]. This scheme uses the DGHV fully homomorphic
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encryption scheme to compute encrypted database queries. The chapters are orga-
nized as follows. In Chapter 2, we summarize the background material, discuss the
notions of full and partial homomorphisms, and formally define what it means to be
fully homomorphic. In Chapter 3, we look closely at the integer based fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme (commonly known as the DGHV scheme) introduced by
Dijk et al. [15], which is a conceptually simpler version of Gentry’s original blueprint.
We also introduce Gentry’s idea of “bootstrapping”, which transforms a somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme (such as the DGHV scheme) to a fully homomorphic
one. The DGHV scheme has a wide variety of practical applications including loca-
tion based privacy [20], database security [19], and privacy preserving in healthcare
applications [45], among many others. Chapter 4 gives a detailed description of the
models proposed by Gahi et al. [19,20] to preserve location and database privacy us-
ing the DGHV scheme. In Chapter 5, we introduce our new protocol, Homomorphic
Query Processing method, to process database queries. Our protocol does not rely
on the DGHV scheme and can be used with more modern fully homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes like the ring based fully homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by
Braserski et al [12]. In Chapter 6, we summarize recent integrations of homomorphic
encryption schemes to preserve privacy in aggregation calculations in the smart grid.
In Chapter 7, we discuss querying data in the smart electric grid and propose a new
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scheme that can be used to query smart meter data with respect to a given set of
keywords. Finally, in Chapter 8, we conclude with a discussion of challenges faced
by each proposed aggregation protocol, as well as our proposed schemes and future
research directions.
A summary of results of this thesis (specifically the Homomorphic Query Pro-
cessing scheme) is published at the 14th Canadian Workshop on Information Theory
(CWIT) [39].
Chapter 2
Background
In this section, we present the background material needed to study the DGHV
encryption scheme and Gahi’s protocol. We start with an introduction to fully and
partially homomorphic encryption schemes. Then, we define what it means to be
fully homomorphic based on the definition proposed by Rivest et al [42]. We also give
a high level overview of the construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme,
as proposed by Gentry [22].
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2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a novel method that allows computations to be carried
out on the ciphertext such that after decryption, the result would be the same as
carrying out identical computations on the plaintext. This has novel implications
such as being able to carry out operations on database queries in the form of cipher-
text and returning the result to the user so that no information about the query is
revealed at the server’s end [10].
The idea of homomorphic encryptions is not new, and even the oldest of ciphers,
ROT13 developed in ancient Rome, had homomorphic properties with respect to
string concatenations [26]. Certain modern ciphers such as RSA and El Gamal also
support homomorphic multiplication of cipher texts [26]. The idea of a “fully” ho-
momorphic encryption scheme (or privacy homomorphism) which supports two ho-
momorphic operations was first introduced by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzous in
1978 [42]. After more than three decades, the first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme was founded by Gentry in 2009 with his breakthrough construction of a lat-
tice based cryptosystem that supports both homomorphic additions and multiplica-
tions [22]. Although the lattice based system is not used in practice, it paved the
way for many other simpler and more efficient fully homomorphic models constructed
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afterwards.
2.2 Fully and Partially Homomorphic Encryption
Schemes
Homomorphic cryptosystems can be broadly categorized into fully homomorphic and
partially homomorphic schemes (Figure 2.1). Partially homomorphic encryption
schemes are homomorphic with respect to one operation such as multiplication in
the case of the RSA cryptosystem. A schematic diagram of an additive homomor-
phic encryption scheme is given in Figure 2.2. Here, we have an encryption scheme
(denoted by Enc) that outputs two ciphertexts c1 and c2 when operated on the two
plaintexts x1 and x2 (with key k), respectively. Since the scheme is additively homo-
morphic, we have the following relation between the plaintexts and ciphertexts.
Enck(x1) + Enck(x2) = Enck(x1 + x2)
Fully homomorphic encryption schemes, on the other hand, support two operations
(addition and multiplication). Up to date, there is quite a number of partially homo-
morphic encryption schemes that are well understood and practically used. However,
the field of fully homomorphic encryption is quite recent, and the currently avail-
able fully homomorphic encryption schemes are mostly proof of concept and can only
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Figure 2.1: Fully and Partially Homomorphic Schemes
be carried out with respect to a small number of operations or with very high end
laboratory settings [36]. One of the main reasons for the impracticality of fully ho-
momorphic encryption schemes is that the ciphertext size and the computation time
increases rapidly as the security level increases.
As much as we would like to have a cryptosystem that is homomorphic with
respect to one operation, the application of such a scheme is limited by the fact that
not every computation of our liking can be performed with only one operation. For
example, to find the mean or average value of a sample, we would need a homomorphic
encryption scheme that supports one multiplication at the very least. Moreover, the
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Decryption
k
c1 = Enck(x1)
c2 = Enck(x2)
c1 + c2
x1 + x2
Figure 2.2: Additive Homomorphic Scheme
fact that any computation on a computational device (computers, calculators, etc.)
can be designed through a Boolean circuit (a circuit that consists of addition and
multiplication gates), makes fully homomorphic encryption schemes highly appealing.
With a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we can outsource computations to
cloud with reasonable guarantee (upto the hardness of breaking the scheme) that
the computations will be performed blindly. For example, consider the case where
two parties, Alice and Bob, want to communicate with each other (Figure 2.3). Alice
would like to send Bob three numbers x1, x2, and x3, and get the result of a calculation
performed by Bob. However, Alice does not want Bob to know the three numbers
she sends. Therefore, she would like to encrypt these numbers using an appropriate
encryption scheme before sending it to Bob. However, Alice also want Bob to be able
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to perform the calculation even though the numbers are encrypted. This problem is
solved using a homomorphic encryption scheme. Alice encrypts her numbers using
a homomorphic encryption scheme that is then sent to Bob. Bob can perform his
calculation on the encrypted numbers as though they are not encrypted. However,
Bob will only see the ciphertexts and not the actual numbers x1, x2, and x3. Finally,
Bob will send the result of the calculation back to Alice to decrypt and obtain the
result. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Currently, it is common practice
to decrypt the data at the server-side before doing any calculation. However, this
places the user’s privacy in jeopardy because the user is forced to assume that the
server is trusted. Hence, using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is the key
to successfully ensuring many security and privacy assumptions that are prevalent in
current communication protocols.
We will first look at the RSA cryptosystem as a typical example of a partially
homomorphic encryption scheme.
2.3 Partial Homomorphism - RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA Cryptosystem was introduced by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman in 1977. Although not intentionally introduced as a homomorphic encryp-
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c1 = Encpk(x1),
c2 = Encpk(x2),
c3 = Encpk(x3)
c1 × (c2 + c3)
Decsk(c1 × (c2 + c3)) = x1 × (x2 + x3)
Alice
Bob
c1 × (c2 + c3)
Figure 2.3: Alice, Bob, and Fully Homomorphic Encryption
tion scheme, the RSA scheme shows homomorphic qualities with respect to multipli-
cation. The RSA scheme operates as follows:
• KeyGen: Select two random large prime numbers, p and q. Compute their
product, n = pq. Choose e such that 1 < e < ϕ(n) and gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1, where
ϕ is the Euler’s Totient function. Compute d such that ed ≡ 1(mod ϕ(n)).
Public Key: (e, n), Private Key: (d, ϕ(n))
• Enc: For a message m, compute c = me (mod n).
• Dec: For a ciphertext c, compute m = cd (mod n).
where KeyGen, Enc, and Dec denote the key generation, encryption, and decryp-
tion algorithms, respectively. Now, consider two plaintexts x1 and x2 encrypted by
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the RSA scheme.
Enc(x1) = x
e
1 (mod n) and Enc(x2) = x
e
2 (mod n)
Therefore,
Enc(x1)× Enc(x2) = xe1 × xe2 (mod n) = (x1x2)e (mod n) = Enc(x1 × x2)
Therefore, the RSA scheme is clearly homomorphic with respect to multiplication.
2.4 Fully Homomorphism
The importance of fully homomorphic encryption schemes and the question of whether
such schemes actually exist was first proposed by Ronald Rivest, Len Adleman, and
Michael Dertouzos in 1978, immediately following the introduction of the RSA cryp-
tosystem [42]. In their own words the question statement was as follows.
“A scheme E with an efficient algorithm EvaluateE such that, for any valid
public key pk, any circuit C, and any ciphertexts ψi ← EncryptE(pk, πi)
outputs,
ψ ← EvaluateE(pk, C, ψ1, . . . , ψt)
where ψ is a valid encryption of C(π1, . . . , πt) under pk.”
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Here, πi denotes the plaintext. For more than three decades, it was an open problem
whether such schemes exist. However, as we will see in the next chapter, this problem
was answered by Craig Gentry in 2009.
2.4.1 Overview of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
At a high level, Gentry’s idea can be described by the following general model. This
is the blueprint that is used in all homomorphic encryption schemes that followed.
1. Develop a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme that is restricted to
evaluating a finite number of additions or multiplications. In other words, the
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that we construct is only limited to
evaluating low-degree polynomials.
2. Modify the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme to make it Bootstrap-
pable, that is, modifying it so that it could evaluate its own decryption circuit
plus at least one additional NAND gate.
The somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme usually introduces a noise when-
ever a homomorphic operation is carried out, and when the noise exceeds a certain
threshold, the scheme loses its homomorphic ability. The idea behind constructing a
bootstrappable scheme is that whenever the noise level is about to reach the thresh-
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old, we can bootstrap it so that the resulting ciphertext will give the same encrypted
value but with a lower noise. In this way, if the ciphertext is bootstrapped from time
to time, an arbitrary number of operations can be carried out.
In the next chapter, we will define a fully homomorphic encryption scheme com-
monly known as the DGHV scheme, which is used to process database queries se-
curely.
Chapter 3
Integer Based Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (DGHV Scheme)
3.1 DGHV Scheme
The DGHV scheme was introduced by Marten van Dijk, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi,
and Vinod Vaikuntanathan in 2010, and this scheme operates on integers as opposed
to lattices in Gentry’s original construction. The scheme follows Gentry’s original
blueprint by first constructing a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The
key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of the DGHV scheme are given
below.
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Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter and set N = λ, P = λ2 and Q = λ5. The
scheme is based on the following algorithms;
• KeyGen(λ): The key generation algorithm that randomly chooses a P -bit
integer p as the secret key.
• Enc(m, p): The bit m ∈ {0, 1} is encrypted by
c = m′ + pq,
where m′ ≡ m (mod 2) and q, m′ are random Q-bit and N -bit numbers, re-
spectively. Note that we can also write the ciphertext as c = m+ 2r + pq since
m′ = m+ 2r for some r ∈ Z.
• Dec(c, p): Output (c mod p) mod 2 where (c mod p) is the integer c′ in (−p/2, p/2)
such that p divides c− c′.
The value m′ is called the noise of the ciphertext. Note that this scheme, as it is given
above, is symmetric (i.e., it only has a private key). We can define the public key as
a random subset sum of encryptions of zeros, that is, the public key is a randomly
choosen sum from a predefined set of encryptions of zeros: S = {2r1 + pq1, 2r2 +
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pq2, . . . , 2rn + pqn}. A typical encryption of the plaintext m would be,
c = m+
∑
i∈T
(2ri + pqi)
= m+ 2
∑
i∈T
ri + p
∑
i∈T
qi,
where T ⊆ S. From here on we shall use m′ to denote m +∑i∈T ri and q to denote∑
i∈T qi.
This scheme is homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication and
decrypts correctly as long as the noise level does not exceed p/2 in absolute value.
That is, |m′| < p/2. Let c1 and c2 be two ciphertexts obtained using the DGHV
scheme, that is,
c1 = m
′
1 + pq1 and c1 = m
′
2 + pq2,
where m′1 = m1(mod 2) and m
′
2 = m2(mod 2). Addition of c1 and c2 results in,
c1 + c2 = (m
′
1 +m
′
2) + p(q1 + q2).
Thus,
Enc(m1, p) + Enc(m2, p) = Enc(m1 ⊕m2, p).
Decryption works as long as,
|m′1 +m′2| <
p
2
.
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Similarly, multiplying c1 and c2 results in,
c1c2 = (m
′
1 + pq1)(m
′
2 + pq2)
= m′1m
′
2 + p(m
′
1q2 +m
′
2q1 + pq1q2)
Hence,
Enc(m1, p)× Enc(m2, p) = Enc(m1 ×m2, p)
Here, decryption works as long as,
|m′1m′2| <
p
2
.
Hence, this is a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme in the sense that once the
noise level exceeds p/2, the scheme loses its homomorphic ability. In other words, this
scheme can evaluate any function that is composed of a collection of additions and
multiplications as long as the p/2 threshold is not reached. Since any computation
can be expressed as a collection of additions and multiplications (i.e., a Boolean
Circuit), this would imply that extending this scheme to perform an arbitrary amount
of additions and multiplications would allow us to compute any Boolean function
without decrypting the ciphertext. This is the breakthrough idea of Gentry called
Bootstrapping, discussed in the next section.
We shall illustrate the DGHV scheme mentioned previously through a small ex-
ample. Let N = λ = 2. Then, P = λ2 = 4 and Q = λ5 = 32. Suppose the plaintext
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bit that we would like to encrypt is 1. Choose p = 10 as the secret key, q = 15 and
m′ = 3 so that,
c = 3 + (10× 15) = 153.
Thus the ciphertext for this particular choice of parameters is 153. The decryption is
given by,
(c mod p) mod 2 = (153 mod 10) mod 2 = 3 mod 2 = 1.
And therefore we can see that decryption works as expected.
3.2 Bootstrapping
Suppose we have two ciphertexts c1 and c2 encrypted using the DGHV scheme. That
is,
c1 ← Enc(m1, pk1) and c2 ← Enc(m2, pk1)
where m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1} are the corresponding plaintexts and pk1 is the public key that
has the corresponding secret key sk1. Encrypt the secret key sk1 by a second public
key pk2. We will denote the vector of encrypted bits of sk1 by sk1. That is each bit
sk1i of sk1 is encrypted by the DGHV scheme:
sk1i ← Enc(sk1i, pk2)
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Denote the decryption function augmented by an addition as DecAdd and the decryp-
tion function augmented by a multiplication as DecMult. The two functions DecAdd
and DecMult can be defined as follows:
DecAdd(c1, c2) = m1 +m2
and
DecMul(c1, c2) = m1m2
Encrypt each ciphertext c1 and c2 by the second public key pk2. Since c1 and c2 are
integers we have to perform the encryption over each bit separately as before.
c1i ← Enc(c1i, pk2) and c2i ← Enc(c2i, pk2)
Finally output,
c← Evaluate(pk2,DecAdd, sk1, c1, c2),
where Evaluate denotes evaluating the DecAdd function homomorphically (in other
words, evaluating the Boolean circuit corresponding to the DecAdd function). Note
that sk1, c1, and c2 are all encrypted by pk2. Since the Evaluate algorithm can evaluate
DecAdd, it will take the cipher texts c1, c2, and sk1 and evaluate the function DecAdd
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homomorphically. Therefore,
c = c1 + c2
= Enc(m1, pk1) + Enc(m2, pk1)
= Enc(m1 ⊕m2, pk1)
Similarly the function DecMul can be evaluated homomorphically to obtain,
c′ ← Evaluate(pk2,DecMult, sk1, c1, c2),
where c′ = Enc(m1m2, pk1). Hence, whenever the noise level is about to reach its
threshold value (i.e. p/2) we can perform a homomorphic decryption on the cipher-
text, which will give us a re-encryption of the same ciphertext with a lower noise
level. Thus, any arbitrary function (precisely a Boolean function) can be evaluated
by bootstrapping the ciphertext periodically.
In the next chapter, we look at how the DGHV scheme can be used to process
queries in a database. This is useful when queries have to be processed secretly such
that only the user knows what he is searching for. For example, a typical application
of this kind of scheme would be a medical database, where the database should not
know what the user is searching for in order to preserve privacy of the users.
Chapter 4
Query Processing Using the
DGHV Scheme
The DGHV scheme can be used to create a protocol that establishes blind searching
in databases. This method was proposed by Gahi et al. [19].
Suppose we need to retrieve a particular record(s) from the database. Typically,
we send a query to the database encrypted using the DGHV scheme. Let vi be the
ith bit of the query v and ci be the i
th bit of a record R in database D. Both the
query and the database record is encrypted using the DGHV scheme. Suppose the
plaintext bit corresponding to vi is mi and the plaintext bit corresponding to ci is m
′
i.
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Then,
vi = mi + 2ri + pqi
and
ci = m
′
i + 2r
′
i + pq
′
i,
where ri, r
′
i, qi and q
′
i are random numbers and p is the secret key. The server shall
compute the following sum for each record:
Ir =
∏
i
(1 + ci + vi), for every R ∈ D, (4.1)
where r denotes the index of record R. If mi = m
′
i, then mi+m
′
i = 0 or mi+m
′
i = 2
since mi,m
′
i ∈ {0, 1}:
1 + ci + vi = 1 + (m
′
i + 2r
′
i + pq
′
i) + (mi + 2ri + pqi)
= 1 + (mi +m
′
i) + 2(ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
Case 1: mi +m
′
i = 0,
1 + ci + vi = 1 + 2(ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= Enc(1)
Case 2: mi +m
′
i = 2,
1 + ci + vi = 1 + 2(1 + ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= Enc(1)
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(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
“Query”→ (m1,m2,m3,m4,m5)
Alice
Bob
(c1, c2, c3, c4, c5)
(m1,m2,m3,m4,m5)
DGHV−−−−→ (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5) Calculates
5∏
i=1
(1 + vi + ci)
Figure 4.1: Calculation of Ir values
This results in Ir = Enc(1). On the other hand, if mi ̸= m′i, then mi +m′i = 1 since
mi,m
′
i ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore,
1 + ci + vi = 1 + (m
′
i + 2r
′
i + pq
′
i) + (mi + 2ri + pqi)
= 1 + (mi +m
′
i) + 2(ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= 1 + 1 + 2(ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= 2(1 + ri + r
′
i) + p(qi + q
′
i)
= Enc(0)
This results in Ir = Enc(0). Hence, for each record in the database we will have an
Ir value that is equal to Enc(1) or Enc(0) depending on whether the search query
matches the corresponding record or not (Figure 4.1). Secondly, we calculate the
partial sums of the Ir values (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Example database and corresponding Ir and Sr values
Database Records Ir Sr
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(1) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 1, 0) Enc(0) Enc (1)
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(1) Enc (2)
(1, 1, 0, 1) Enc(0) Enc (2)
(1, 0, 0, 0) Enc(0) Enc (2)
Sr =
∑
i≤r
Ii. (4.2)
As an example, let us consider a database that has five records, each encoded with
4 bits. If the query sent by the user is (Enc(1),Enc(1),Enc(0),Enc(0)), we obtain
the corresponding Ir and Sr values, as shown in Table 4.1. Using these partial sums,
we can then calculate the sequence (I ′r,j) for every record R with index r and every
positive integer j ≤ r:
I ′r,j = Ir
∏
i
(1 + j¯i + Sr,i) for every R ∈ D, (4.3)
where Sr,i is the i
th bit of Sr and j¯i represents the i
th bit of the encryption of j,
where j ≤ r. Hence, these sequences have the property that whenever Ir = Enc(1)
and Sr = Enc(j), we have I
′
r,j = Enc(1). Otherwise, I
′
r,j = Enc(0). In our previous
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example, we would have,
(I ′1) = (Enc(1))
(I ′2) = (Enc(0),Enc(0))
(I ′3) = (Enc(0),Enc(1),Enc(0))
(I ′4) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
(I ′5) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
Finally, we calculate,
(R′) =
∑
k
Enc(Rk)(I
′
k), (4.4)
where Rk is the k
th record in D. So, (R′) is a sequence containing only the encrypted
records that matches our search query. Note that the definition of (R′) relies on
adding vectors of different lengths. This is done in the natural way, whereby all the
vectors are made the same length by padding with zeros prior to addition. In the
above example, we obtain,
(R′) = (Enc(R1),Enc(R3),Enc(0),Enc(0))
At this point the sequence (R′) will contain all the records that match our query, but
with trailing encryptions of zeros we do not need. Hence, a second sum is calculated
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(v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
“Query”→ (1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
Alice
Bob
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
DGHV−−−−→ (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5)
∑
r
Ir
Dec
(∑
r
Ir, sk
)
= 2
(Enc(R1),Enc(R3))
Figure 4.2: Alice, Bob, and Gahi’s Protocol
at the server side to determine the number of terms that are useful in the sequence:
n =
∑
r
Ir
This result can be returned to the user and decrypted to obtain the number of records
that match the search query. Hence, the sequence (R′) can be truncated at the
appropriate point and returned to the user for decryption. The whole process is
illustrated in Figure 4.2. An update query can be performed by,
Rnew = (1 + Ir)R + IrU, for every R ∈ D,
where U is the new value that we wish to insert whenever the query matchesR (or Ir =
Enc(1)). A deletion of a record can be performed by,
Rnew = (1 + Ir)R for every R ∈ D.
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To perform all these operations without exceeding the maximum noise permitted
(p/2), it is necessary to choose the parameters N,P, and Q appropriately.
Remark
Although according to Gahi’s original paper [19] both the query and the database
records are encrypted when calculating Ir in equation 4.1, we note that it is not
strictly necessary. We show below that only encrypting the query is sufficient. Let vi
be the ith bit of the query v, and let the plaintext bit corresponding to vi is mi. Now
suppose only the query is encrypted:
vi = mi + 2ri + pqi,
where ri, qi are random numbers and p is the encryption key. Let ci be the i
th bit of
the database record. Now, the database is not encrypted and therefore if ci = mi,
then ci +mi = 0 or ci +mi = 2.
Case 1: ci +mi = 0,
1 + ci + vi = 1 + ci + (mi + 2ri + pqi)
= 1 + 2ri + pqi
= Enc(1)
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Case 2: ci +mi = 2,
1 + ci + vi = 1 + ci + (mi + 2ri + pqi)
= 1 + 2(1 + ri) + pqi
= Enc(1)
On the other hand, if ci ̸= mi then ci +mi = 1, since ci,mi ∈ {0, 1},
1 + ci + vi = 1 + ci + (mi + 2ri + pqi)
= 1 + (ci +mi) + 2ri + pqi
= 2(1 + ri) + pqi
= Enc(0)
Therefore, we note that for the purpose of equation 4.1, the database records need
not be encrypted.
Gahi’s method works on plaintext bits and thus requires significant computational
ability on the part of the server. This is due to the fact that it is restricted to the
DGHV scheme which processes plaintext bits separately. In the next chapter we
propose an alternative protocol called the Homomorphic Query Processing Scheme.
This protocol enables us to process database queries using more modern fully homo-
morphic encryption schemes such as the ring based scheme proposed by Braserski et
al. [12], which act on blocks of plaintext rather than single bits.
Chapter 5
Homomorphic Query Processing
The main drawback in Gahi’s method is that it requires an enormous number of ho-
momorphic operations because it employs the DGHV encryption scheme, which uses
bitwise encryption. We propose an alternative protocol called Homomorphic Query
Processing that is compatible with the more recent ring-based fully homomorphic
encryption scheme introduced by Braserski et al. [12]. The major advantage is that
Braserski’s method works on plaintext and ciphertext blocks and thus the number of
homomorphic operations required can be greatly reduced.
We first give a brief introduction to the ring based fully homomorphic Encryption
Scheme proposed by Braserski, and then proceed to define our Homomorphic Query
Processing method.
5.1 Ring Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption 33
5.1 Ring Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption
This encryption scheme was introduced by Braserski, et al [12] and operates on the
polynomial ring R = Z[X]/ ⟨f(x)⟩; the ring of polynomials with integer coefficients
modulo f(x), where f(x) =
∏
1≤k≤n
gcd(k,n)=1
(
x− e2iπ kn
)
is the nth cyclomatic polynomial.
The plaintext is defined on the ring Rt = Zt[x]/ ⟨f(x)⟩, where t is an integer. The
key generation and encryption functions make use of two distributions χkey and χerr
on R for generating small elements. The uniform distribution χkey is used in the key
generation, and the discrete Gaussian distribution χerr is used to sample small noise
polynomials. Specific details can be found in [11] and [12]. The scheme is based on
the following algorithms.
• KeyGen(n, q, t, χkey, χerr): Operating on the input degree n and moduli q and
t, this algorithm generates the public and private keys (pk, sk) = (h, f), where
f = [tf ′ + 1]q and h = [tgf−1]q. Here, the key generation algorithm samples
small polynomials from the key distribution f ′, g → χkey such that f is invertible
modulo q and [.]q denotes coefficients of polynomials in R reduced by modulo
q.
• Encrypt(h,m): Given a message m ∈ R, the Encrypt algorithm samples small
error polynomials s, e→ χerr and outputs, c = [⌊q/t⌋[m]t+ e+ hs]q ∈ R, where
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⌊.⌋ denotes the floor function.
• Decrypt(f, c): Given a ciphertext c, this algorithm outputs,m =
[⌊
t
q
[fc]q
⌉]
t
∈
R.
• Add(c1, c2): Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2, this algorithm outputs cadd(c1, c2) =
[c1 + c2]q.
• Mult(c1, c2): Multiplication of ciphertexts is performed in two steps. First,
compute c˜mult =
[⌊
t
q
c1c2
⌉]
q
. However, this result cannot be decrypted to the
original plaintext using the decryption key f . Therefore, a process known as
key switching is done to transform the ciphertext so that it can be decrypted
with the original secret key. For more details, we refer to [11].
This encryption scheme is homomorphic with respect to addition and multipli-
cation of plaintexts modulo t. The main advantage in using Braserski’s encryption
scheme is that it can be used to encrypt blocks of plaintext instead of dealing with
single bits, as in the DGHV scheme [15]. For example, consider the block of plaintext
bits, 10100. The integer representation of this block is the value 20. We can represent
this integer using the polynomial X2+X4 =
∑4
i=0 2
izi, where zi is the i
th bit of 10100.
In general, if z is an integer and its binary representation is, z = (±1)∑li=0 2izi, where
zi ∈ {0, 1} and l = ⌈log2 |z|⌉, then we can encode the number z as
∑l
i=0 ziX
i ∈ R.
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5.2 Converting the Plaintext Space into a Field
As we shall see, in our Homomorphic Query Processing method, we invert certain
plaintext elements and thus the plaintext space should be a field. Therefore, we
now discuss how to convert the plaintext ring in Braserski’s method to a field. Note
that the plaintext space in Braserski’s method is defined on the polynomial ring,
Rt = Zt[x]/ ⟨f(x)⟩. We shall select t = p, where p is a prime number. Then Rp is
a field if and only if f is irreducible over Zp. Recall that f is the nth cyclomatic
polynomial defined as follows:
f(x) =
∏
1≤k≤n
gcd(k,n)=1
(
x− e2iπ kn
)
Let f(x) = (x − α1)(x − α2) . . . (x − αn) be a polynomial defined on Q[x]. The
discriminant of f , denoted by ∆(f), is defined [25] as,
∆(f) =
∏
i<j
(αi − αj)2
It has been proved in [25] that the nth cyclotomic polynomial reduces modulo all
primes if and only if the discriminant of the nth cyclotomic polynomial is a square in
Z. Hence, by choosing a cyclotomic polynomial whose discriminant is not a square we
can find a prime p such that f is irreducible over Zp. Furthermore, it is shown in [25]
that whenever the discriminant of a cyclotomic polynomial f is not a square in Z, there
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exist infinitely many primes such that f is irreducible over Zp. Thus, we can choose a
cyclotomic polynomial with non-square discriminant and check for irreducibility using
a standard polynomial irreducibility test such as Rabin’s test, until we obtain a prime
for which the cyclotomic polynomial is irreducible. For example, even if we consider
a large cyclotomic polynomial with non-square discriminant like the 107th cyclotomic
(which has degree 106), and consider the primes less than 100, it can be seen that it
is irreducible over many primes: Z2,Z5,Z7,Z17,Z31,Z43,Z59,Z67,Z71,Z73 and Z97.
We now propose our Homomorphic Query Processing scheme, which is compati-
ble with the Braserski’s ring based fully homomorphic encryption scheme mentioned
previously.
5.3 Homomorphic Query Processing
We begin by defining the value Fi for the i
th record (denoted by Ri) in the database.
We write Enc(m) for the Enc(m, pk), where pk is the public key of the user. Then
the user sends Enc(m) to the server to search for the records that match m. Now,
the server computes the following:
Fi =
( ∏
Rk ̸=Ri
Enc(m−Rk)
)( ∏
Rk ̸=Ri
Enc (Ri −Rk)−1
)
, (5.1)
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where each of the products above is over all the records Rk such that Rk ̸= Ri.
Since we are dealing with a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, we can compute
Enc(m−Rk) values by computing Enc(m)−Enc(Rk). Also, since all the Ri values are
known to the server, the term
∏
Rk ̸=Ri Enc (Ri −Rk)
−1 can be reduced to a simpler
form using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme in order to perform
a single encryption. Hence,
Fi =
( ∏
Rk ̸=Ri
Enc(m−Rk)
)
Enc
( ∏
Rk ̸=Ri
(Ri −Rk)
)−1
.
Note that whenever m = Ri (query being equal to the record we are comparing),
we have Fi = Enc(1) and Fi = Enc(0), otherwise. Note that here we are assuming
that the query is contained somewhere in the database. If the query is not contained
anywhere in the database, an encryption of something other than 1 or 0 will be the
output. This special scenario is discussed later.
Now, we define Gi’s, the partial sums of the Fi values, as follows:
Gi =
∑
j≤i
Fj. (5.2)
Using these partial sums, we can then calculate the sequence (F ′i,k) corresponding
to each record as follows,
F ′i,k = (Fi)
(∏
j ̸=k
(Gi − Enc(j))
)⎛⎝Enc(∏
j ̸=k
(k − j)
)−1⎞⎠ , (5.3)
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where 1 ≤ k ≤ i. It can be seen that F ′i,k = Enc(1) if Fi = Enc(1) and Gi = Enc(k)
are both satisfied. Hence, the sequences (F ′i,k) have the property that whenever
Fi = Enc(1) (i.e., the i
th record matches the query), we have an Enc(1) at the kth
position of the sequence where Gi = Enc(k). All other entries of the sequence are
encryptions of zero. Therefore,
(R′) =
∑
k
Enc(Rk)(F
′
k), (5.4)
where Rk is the k-th record in D will give us a sequence containing only the encrypted
records that match our search query. Note that the definition of (R′) relies on adding
vectors of different lengths. This is done in the natural way, whereby all the vectors
are made the same length by padding with zeros prior to addition.
To further illustrate our scheme, let us consider an example where the database
contains five records, each with 4 bits of data. Also, let our encryption scheme encrypt
2 bits at a time. Then, if the search query is (Enc(2), Enc(3)), the corresponding Fi
and Gi values are given in Table 2.
The resulting sequences (F ′i ) would be similar as in Gahi’s scheme,
(F ′1) = (Enc(0))
(F ′2) = (Enc(1),Enc(0))
(F ′3) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
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Table 5.1: Example database and corresponding Fi and Gi values
Database Records Fi Gi
(0, 0, 1, 0) Enc(0) Enc (0)
(1, 0, 1, 1) Enc(1) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 0, 1) Enc(0) Enc (1)
(1, 0, 1, 1) Enc(1) Enc (2)
(1, 1, 0, 0) Enc(0) Enc (2)
(F ′4) = (Enc(0),Enc(1),Enc(0),Enc(0))
(F ′5) = (Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
Therefore, the sequence (R′) would be,
(R′) = (Enc(R2),Enc(R3),Enc(0),Enc(0),Enc(0))
At this point, the sequence (R′) will contain all the records that match our query
but with trailing encryptions of zeros which we do not need. Hence, a second sum is
calculated at the server side to determine the number of terms that are useful in the
sequence:
n =
∑
r
Fr.
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Then n will be returned to the user and decrypted to obtain the number of records
that match the search query. Hence, the sequence (R′) can be truncated at the
appropriate point and returned to the user for decryption.
It should be noted that the server will know the number of records that match the
user’s query. We believe that this information is not sufficient for the server to gain
any additional information about the search query. Alternatively, we could return the
whole sequence without truncation, keeping the number of matching records private
from the server. However, the communication overhead will be increased significantly
in this case, since the length of the sequence will be equal to the number of records
in the database.
As promised previously, we now look at the special case where the record that
is searched for is not contained anywhere in the database. In this case the value
Fi will be something other than an encryption of 1 or 0. These garbage encrypted
values will carry themselves into the rest of the protocol, resulting in equation 5.4
with a nonsensical sequence. Hence, if the user receives a nonsensical sequence as
the final result, it implies that the record that was searched is not contained in the
database. As an alternative approach, we can compute
∏
i (Enc(m)− Enc(Ri)) prior
to computing Fi (equation 5.1) and send it to the user to decrypt. If the result is zero
then m is contained in the database, and if it is non-zero, m is not contained in the
5.4 Comparison of Our Scheme vs. Gahi’s Scheme 41
database and therefore the user can send a message to the server to abort the search.
5.4 Comparison of Our Scheme vs. Gahi’s Scheme
Our scheme has the main advantage of having the potential to be used with more
recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes rather than being restricted to the
DGHV scheme. This gives the flexibility to use our method with block based en-
cryption schemes such as Braserski’s [12], which reduces the number of encryption
steps. For example, referring back to equation 4.1, we can see that the Ir values are
calculated by comparing the query with each record bit-wise. If there arem records in
the database and each of them are encrypted using n bits, the number of operations
that are required to calculate all the Ir values will be O(nm). In our Homomorphic
Query Processing method, equation 5.1 acts as the analog of equation 4.1. How-
ever, the encryptions are done block-wise in our scheme, and hence the number of
operations it would take to calculate the Fi value in equation 5.1 will be O(m). For
equation 4.2 in Gahi’s method, the number of operations that should be performed to
calculate all the partial sums will be O(nm2), since there are O(m2) multiplications
and each multiplication should be done bit-wise; whereas the calculation of partial
sums in our scheme (equation 5.2), the number of operations is reduced to O(m2).
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Similarly, equations 4.3 and 4.4 in Gahi’s method use O(nm) and O(nm2) number
of operations, respectively, but their counterparts in our scheme, (equations 5.3 and
5.4) have O(m) and O(m2) operations, respectively. Thus, it can be seen that in each
step of our scheme, the number of operations performed is reduced by a factor of n
compared to Gahi’s method.
Chapter 6
Homomorphic Encryption and
Smart Grid
In this chapter, we give an introduction to the smart electric grid as well as the
cryptographic protocols that are being used in it. We look at several proposed cryp-
tographic schemes that can be used to compute the total consumption function which
is the commonly needed calculation on the part of the utility provider.
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6.1 Smart Grid and Cybersecurity
Smart grids are a new class of communication grids that has recently gained widespread
attention, mainly in the field of electricity distribution. Conventional power grids con-
sist of two main components: the infrastructure that make up the electric network
and the manpower needed to carry out the associated operations. The infrastruc-
ture consists of physical components that makes up the nuts and bolts of the grid
such as power plants, cable lines, transformers, substations, etc. Along with these
components workers are needed for metering and to collect data to adjust tariff rates
accordingly. However, with the surge of complex consumption patterns, mainly due
to the wide range of electric devices that are commonplace in modern households,
appropriate billing according to the level of consumption of users is necessary. The
fixed tariff scheme that is commonplace was no longer suitable to meet the demands
of highly variable consumption patterns.
Due to these insufficiencies, a new innovative electric grid, emerged during the 21st
century, commonly known as the “smart grid.” It can be defined as an electric grid
with embedded digital processing and communications. Rather than the traditional
one-way electricity distribution from the power plant to consumers, the smart grid
acts more like a communication network that automatically collects user data and
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sends it to the distributor, where the distributor adjusts the tariffs and loads according
to the collected data [37]. In addition, the ultimate goal of implementing the smart
grid is that it will possess the following qualities [13]:
• Intelligent: The capability to sense system failure and perform automated
prevention measures. It is also believed that the smart grid will be able to
respond to these situations faster than a human operator.
• Efficient: Due to optimization of load balancing, it will have the capacity to
meet increased consumer demand without additional infrastructure.
• Accommodating: The ability to easily integrate and include different energy
sources to the grid. This is very important since there is evidence that new
energy sources, such as solar and wind energy, are rapidly coming online.
• Motivating: The ability to connect the consumer and utility in real time so
that users can fine-tune their energy usage based on individual preferences. For
example, having the ability to track daily energy usage informs the consumer
about where most of the energy is spent, and the consumer may opt to change
their lifestyle accordingly.
• Opportunistic: The ease of integration into the market with capabilities such
as plug-and-play devices (e.g., smart meters).
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• Quality Focused: The ability to provide power with the desired quality stan-
dards. For example, with the increasing trend in using electronic devices, con-
sumers demand uninterrupted and very stable power signals without any spikes
and disturbances.
• Resilient: The smart grid is more distributed and hence there is a need for
increased resilience to attacks and disaster recovery measures.
• Green: More environmentally friendly and providing an optimized power man-
agement scheme which contributes to a greener economy.
Although the smart grid is an innovative technological breakthrough, there are many
challenges associated with the collection and dissemination of user data. Most of the
data sent are related to usage patterns of electricity. For example, a household can
have a certain pattern of electricity usage, and this can be used to determine personal
behavioral patterns [6]. This idea is explained in more detail in the following example.
Figure 6.1, taken from [6], shows how the power usage of a typical household
fluctuates in accordance with personal activity. The spikes in the graph represent
occasions where the greatest amount of power is used. Looking at the intensity and
the distribution of energy fluctuations, the devices in operation at that specific time
can be inferred. This is possible because each device that uses a significant amount
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Figure 6.1: Residential Power Usage to Personal Activity Mapping
of power has its own signature power fluctuation. This type of load monitoring is
known as non-intrusive load monitoring (NALM) and it can be used to infer the
number of consumers living within a household and their behaviors [2]. The privacy
risk associated with this kind of load monitoring process is immense, as it provides
an attacker a chance to predict things such as the time at which people are present
in the house and an estimate of the number of people present.
Hence, the need for smart grid cyber security arises. The smart grid consists of
millions of electronic devices that have varying levels of hardware and software con-
straints. Thus blindly applying protocols of IT security may not prove to be useful.
For example, a typical encryption scheme used in IT such as the Advanced Encryp-
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tion Standard (AES) might be too cumbersome for smart grid devices with limited
computational ability. The AES was originally designed for 8-32 bit processors, mak-
ing it less effective when used with constrained devices [7]. Thus, it is necessary to
have dedicated protocols that are tailored specifically for the smart grid. The security
challenges of the smart grid are based on the following properties [6]:
• Scalability: The size of smart grid grows and involves cross linking of multiple
diverse networks. Compatibility issues integrating such diverse protocols is an
ongoing challenge.
• Mix of legacy and modern devices: The smart grid consist of many devices that
are used not only in the generation and distribution of electricity but also in
communication networks. Therefore, all devices used in the smart grid might
not correspond to the same level of functionality as a modern device. Hence, it
is important that protocols are designed in a way that unifies all the new and
old devices.
• Hybrid model of management: The security of the grid should be distributed
and centralized, that is, a device should have the ability to locally authenticate
if the communication network fails for some reason. Hence, a local authenti-
cation system is necessary, along with a centralized database that synchronizes
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credentials.
• Evolving standards and regulations: The standards and regulations that are
currently in place for smart grid cybersecurity are rapidly changing in accor-
dance with new innovations and technologies. Hence, building utilities with
implementation standards that are valid for prolonged periods of time is a chal-
lenge.
In addition to these challenges, the current security goals for the smart grid have
been outlined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) smart
grid interoperability panel [2]. Smart grid security goals can be condensed into three
main categories: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to using access controls to restrict data
access by unauthorized entities. For example, smart meter data should only be
accessed by the grid operators, not other consumers.
• Integrity: Integrity is the prevention of unauthorized modification of data.
Loss of integrity can lead to incorrect decisions regarding power management.
• Availability: Availability is the reliable and timely access to information by
authorized entities. Denial of Service (DOS) attacks attempt to block or corrupt
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communication in the smart grid. Loss of availability can lead to incorrect tariff
calculations and power failures.
Thus, it is evident that there is a need for smart grid security protocols that
allow secure transmission and storage of data. In the next section, we examine a
few recently proposed encryption protocols that offer improvements to smart grid
cybersecurity.
6.2 Cryptography-Based Data Exchange Schemes
for Smart Grid
The transmission of information in the smart grid makes it susceptible to information
leakage and to unauthorized access to sensitive information. To know more about
where information leakage can occur, we consider the parties involved in a smart
grid [16].
• Consumers/Customers: The consumers of a smart grid are its end users.
Each customer has a Smart Meter, which is used to measure their energy usage
and report it to the energy supplier at a specified frequency. For example, the
smart meters implemented by Hydro One send measurements hourly [38]. Smart
meters should be cost efficient and thus have limited computational power.
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Consumers should have access to their energy usage patterns via smart meter
readings.
• Grid Operators: Grid operators are the companies that manage the distri-
bution of electricity. Operators can be part of an energy producer or separate
entities. The distributor will use the smart meter data to efficiently distribute
electricity to its consumers. Electricity distribution uses smart meter data for
load balancing.
• Communication Network: This is the network in which all parties involved
exchange data. The communication channel should be secured to maintain the
privacy of data.
• Electricity Producer: This is the company that produces electricity and dis-
tributes it via the grid operator’s infrastructure. The producer should manage
power production according to the demand and also set tariffs according to
customer usage patterns.
• Aggregator: The aggregator collects all the smart meter data from consumers
and aggregates it to obtain values that the electricity producer can use. For
example, the aggregator can compute the average power consumption of con-
sumers in a certain area at a given time frame. This will help the producer and
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Figure 6.2: Smart Grid and its Stockholders
the distributor to balance the loads efficiently. A schematic representation of
the contributing parties is shown in Figure 6.2 (taken from [16]).
One of the obvious ways to entrust security in the smart grid is to have a cen-
tralized grid management system where the smart meters only measure and send the
data in an encrypted format to a centralized server. The centralized server acts as the
aggregator and communicates with each smart meter to calculate total consumption,
handle load balancing, etc. Since the grid operator controls the cryptographic keys
for each smart meter, it is free to perform any function on the data. However, this
places a universal trust on the grid operator/aggregator, which is undesirable [21].
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If the grid operator is compromised, the whole smart grid will be compromised as
well. Hence, recent proposals focus on grid management that is more widely dis-
tributed [14,40]. Rather than relying on a centralized grid operator for total security,
the goal is to distribute trust to smart meters and substations and to design them to
be independent of the grid operator.
One of the novel methods of preserving privacy in the smart grid is to use homo-
morphic encryption schemes. Since homomorphic encryption schemes allow comput-
ing on encrypted data, the grid operator does not require handling of smart meter
data in plaintext format. Before looking into how homomorphic encryption schemes
can be used in the smart grid context, we specify the types of statistical functions that
the grid operator wants to compute. The most typical and important calculations
that any grid operator wants to perform is the total consumption CT (t) and billing
B(t) at a given time t. Both values can be represented by the general summation of
the smart meter readings mi,t:
GS(t) =
∑
Ms
f(mi,t),
where i indicates the smart meter index and t indicates the time slot. Here, Ms rep-
resents index i or time t, depending on whether the total consumption or the billing
function is being calculated. In the case of the total consumption, we are interested
in calculating the summation over all smart meters and therefore the summation
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becomes
∑
i f(mi,t). For billing of a single household over a given time t, the sum-
mation is
∑
t f(mi,t). In the case of total consumption, f is the identity function
(i.e., f(mi,t) = mi,t); for billing, f is an appropriate billing function [16]. Typically,
the billing function is calculated by multiplying the energy rate designated by the
power provider with the total consumption during the given period. We now look
into privacy preserving schemes that aim to compute these aggregation functions.
6.2.1 Encryption Schemes for Total Consumption
In this section, we examine several encryption protocols that aim to protect privacy
in calculating the total consumption, namely:
CT (t) =
∑
Ms
f(mi,t) =
∑
i
mi,t
We assume that smart meters have the following capabilities.
• The ability to communicate with the utility provider as well as each other.
The connections can be wired or wireless. For example, currently implemented
smart meter protocols use Bluetooth and ZigBee [5, 47].
• Every smart meter on the network has the ability to provide a valid digital cer-
tificate for authentication. This automatically assumes that there is a certificate
authority.
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• Smart meters can perform cryptographic operations. Due to hardware con-
straints, it is generally agreed that they can only perform fairly simple cryp-
tographic protocols. The exact type of cryptographic protocols that a smart
meter is allowed to carry out varies according to different sources, but they
can typically perform hash functions, pseudorandom number generators, sym-
metric (e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard), and asymmetric encryption (e.g.,
Rivest-Sharmir-Adleman (RSA), Paillier, and El Gamal) [16].
Secret Sharing, first proposed by Shamir [43], is one of the first methods for preserving
privacy in smart meter data. Its basic operating principle is to divide a secret S into
n pieces such that, with all n pieces, the secret can be reconstructed, but any number
of pieces less than n is inadequate to find the secret. The method that we are going
to look into was proposed by Garcia and Jacobs and it uses Shamir’s Secret Sharing
as well as the Paillier additive homomorphic encryption scheme [21].
First, we briefly describe the Paillier cryptosystem. The Paillier encryption scheme
consist of the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(p, q, g): The key generation phase takes two large primes p and q as
inputs and computes n = pq and λ(n) = lcm(p−1, q−1), where lcm(p−1, q−1)
denotes the least common multiple of p − 1 and q − 1. Then, select a random
integer g ∈ Z∗n2 , where Z∗n2 denotes the invertible elements of Zn2 and the order
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of g is a multiple of n. Note that since g ∈ Z∗n2 , g and n2 are relatively prime.
Therefore g is relatively prime to n. Thus by Carmichael’s Theorem, gλ(n) ≡
1 mod n. For calculating the decryption function the value gλ(n) mod n2 is
necessary. Note that, gλ(n) mod n2 ≡ gλ(n) mod n and therefore by the previous
result, gλ(n) mod n2 ≡ 1 mod n. Thus, subtracting one from gλ(n) mod n2 will
give a number divisible by n. Define,
L(u) = u− 1
n
,
and compute L(gλ(n) mod n2). Notice that since gλ(n) is calculated in mod n2,
it is greater than zero and strictly less than n2. Thus dividing gλ(n) mod n2
by n results in a value greater than or equal to zero, but strictly less than n.
That is, L(gλ(n) mod n2) ∈ Zn. Since n = pq, as long as L(gλ(n) mod n2) is not
congruent to a multiple of p or q mod n, then L(gλ(n) mod n2) has an inverse.
This existence of inverse is crucial for decryption, and therefore if the inverse
does not exist, choose a new value for g before proceeding further. Finally
calculate µ = (L(gλ(n) mod n2))−1 mod n. The public key of this scheme is
(n, g) and the private key is (λ, µ).
• Enc(m, r): The encryption phase takes a message from the message space Zn
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and a random number r ∈ Z∗n and computes the ciphertext,
E(m, r) = gmrnmod n2
• Dec(c, p, q): The decryption of the ciphertext c is given by,
m = L(cλ mod n2).µ mod n
The Paillier scheme is additively homomorphic since E(m1, r)E(m2, r) = g
m1+m2r2n =
E(m1 +m2, r). Further details on this scheme can be found in [41].
The basic goal of Garcia’s protocol is to divide a smart meter measurement into
shares that are equal to the number of participants in the protocol. We will explain
the protocol using a three party scenario. Suppose Alice, Bob, and Charles have smart
meters and their smart meter readings are mA,mB, and mC , respectively. Each party
will acquire three shares from their measurements. For example, Alice will have the
shares mA(1),mA(2), and mA(3).
Alice: mA = mA(1) +mA(2) +mA(3)
Bob: mB = mB(1) +mB(2) +mB(3)
Charles: mC = mC(1) +mC(2) +mC(3)
Then, Alice will keep one share and encrypt the other two shares with the Paillier
encryption scheme using the public keys of Bob and Charles, respectively (Figure
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Figure 6.3: Partitioning the Smart Meter Readings
6.3). Each party then sends their encrypted shares to the utility provider/aggregator,
keeping the unencrypted value to themselves. The aggregator will multiply the shares,
which are encrypted using the same key and due to the homomorphic nature of the
Paillier encryption scheme, we have,
Alice: EPA(mB(1)).EPA(mC(1)) = EPA(mB(1) +mC(1))
Bob: EPB(mA(2)).EPB(mC(2)) = EPB(mA(2) +mC(2))
Charles: EPC (mA(3)).EPC (mB(3)) = EPC (mA(3) +mB(3))
The aggregator sends these values to the respective party that owns the correspond-
ing private key, who then decrypts the value and adds their share to it (Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.4: Calculation of Partial Aggregations
Finally, each party sends their value to the aggregator to calculate the total consump-
tion value by adding all the values it receives. This protocol can be extended to n
parties easily. Let mi denote the smart meter value of the i
th party and let pi denote
his public key. Let mj,i denote the j
th share of mi. That is, mi =
∑
j mj,i. The
aggregator will calculate,
Ei =
∏
j ̸=i
Epi(mj(i)) = Epi
(∑
j ̸=i
mj(i)
)
,
which he sends to the ith party for decryption. Upon decryption he can add mi(i) as
usual to obtain the sum of all the values encrypted under pi.
This method uses a simple protocol to establish smart data privacy; however, in
the case of n parties, each party will have to perform n− 1 encryptions and therefore
the total number of encryptions will be n(n− 1) = O(n2). Similarly, it can be shown
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that the number of multiplications for an n-party protocol is also O(n2). Due to this
quadratic running time, this protocol is not quite scalable.
Hence, a second approach is presented by Kursawe et al. [31]. Kursawe’s approach
is based on comparison protocols where the aggregator knows a rough estimate of the
total consumption (e.g., from past measurements). Each of the parties computes
gm1+r1i , g
m2+r2
i , g
m3+r3
3 and so forth, where gi is a unique identifier based on a serial
number or the date and time of the measurement. The values r1, r2, and r3 are
computed in random such that their sum is equal to zero. The aggregator can take
the product of all the smart meter outputs to obtain,
∏
j
g
mj+rj
i = g
∑
j(mj+rj)
i = g
∑
j mj
i .
Since the aggregator has an approximate value, CTot of the total consumption he can
now compute gCToti , g
CTot−1
i , g
CTot+1
i , . . . and compare for equality. The authors also
propose several protocols that describe ways to generate rj and gi. We consider a
protocol that is based on the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange scheme.
In this scheme, we assume that each meter j has a secret key X = Rj and a
corresponding public key Pubj. For each round i, a generator gi of the Diffie-Hellman
group is chosen.
• First, each smart meter j computes a round-specific public key, Pubi,j = gRji
6.2 Cryptography-Based Data Exchange Schemes for Smart Grid 61
based on its secret key and the generator.
• The round keys are certified and distributed among all the smart meters in-
cluded in the aggregation.
• Each smart meter computes the value,
g
rj
i =
∏
k ̸=j
Pub
(−1)k<jRj
i,k ,
where k < j takes the value 1 if k is less than j, and is 0 otherwise. It can be
seen that the summation of all rj values is equal to zero:
∑
j
rj =
∑
j
∑
k ̸=j
(−1)k<jRkRj = 0
Thus, each smart meter can calculate g
mj
i g
rj
i to obtain g
mj+rj
i , as required by the
protocol. A summary of this protocol is depicted in Figure 6.5. As before, the
number of messages exchanged between n parties is O(n2) because each smart meter
must distribute its Diffie Hellman key to every other smart meter. The number of
multiplications isO(n); thus, this protocol has fewer multiplications than the previous
scheme. Furthermore, in Kursawe’s original paper [31], it is suggested that a key size
of 256 bits should be used for the Diffie Hellman algorithm, which is significantly
smaller compared to the key size of the Pallier encryption scheme proposed earlier by
Garcia and Jacobs [21].
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Figure 6.5: Kursawe’s Protocol for Data Aggregation
The third approach is by Erkin and Tsudik and uses a slightly altered version of
the Paillier encryption scheme [17]. The idea behind Erkin and Tsudik’s scheme is
to break n into shares n1, n2, n3 . . . and distribute one share per smart meter. Each
smart meter will then encrypt their consumption value as,
E(mi, r) = g
mirnimod n2,
where i denotes the ith smart meter. These values are then sent to the aggregator.
Note that the aggregator cannot decrypt these values, even if he has the secret key,
since in order for decryption to work, the random numbers rni should be of the form
rn. However, after receiving all the shares, the aggregator can add them together to
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obtain the total consumption value, which he can now decrypt (see Figure 6.6).
∏
i
E(mi, r) =
∏
i
gmirnimod n2
= g
∑
imir
∑
i nimod n2
= g
∑
imirnmod n2
= E
(∑
i
mi, r
)
This method assumes that every party has the same random number, r. One way of
achieving this is to take r as a hash of the time stamp. The main advantage of Erkin
and Tsudik’s protocol is that smart meters only need to perform one encryption.
However, each smart meter must have the ability to perform Paillier encryption, a
hash function, and random number generation (for r). Hence, the number of encryp-
tions is reduced at the cost of introducing several different cryptographic algorithms.
The major downside of this protocol is that the smart meters have to perform Paillier
encryption as well as computing hashes and random numbers. To mitigate this issue,
A´cs and Castelluccia [3] proposed a very simple protocol that does not use compu-
tationally intensive schemes such as Paillier encryption. The encryption function of
the cryptosystem that A´cs and Castelluccia introduced is given by,
E(m, k, n) = m+ k mod n
where m is the message to be encrypted, k is the key and n is a large integer. Note
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Figure 6.6: Erkin and Tsudik’s Protocol for Data Aggregation
that this scheme is homomorphic with respect to addition.
E(m1, k1, n) + E(m2, k2, n) = (m1 + k1) mod n + (m2 + k2) mod n
= m1 +m2 + k1 + k2 mod n
= E(m1 +m2, k1 + k2, n)
The protocol starts by choosing a subset of smart meters. Let us walk through an
example with three consumers: Alice, Bob, and Charles. Each user shares a random
number with every other user in a cyclic fashion, as shown in Figure 6.7.
In our example, Alice sends r1 to Bob, Bob sends r2 to Charles, and Charles sends
r3 to Alice. Let us also assume that each participant shares a secret key with the
aggregator: KA, KB and KC respectively. Alice adds to her measurement what she
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Figure 6.7: A´cs and Castelluccia’s Protocol for Data Aggregation
sends (in this case r1), while subtracting what she receives (in this case r3). Bob
and Charles do the same. Finally, all participants encrypt their values using the
aforementioned encryption scheme. The results are given below.
Alice: E(m1, KA, n) = m1 + r1 − r3 +KA mod n
Bob: E(m2, KB, n) = m2 − r1 + r2 +KB mod n
Charles: E(m1, KA, n) = m1 + r3 − r2 +KC mod n
Each smart meter sends these encrypted values to the aggregator, which adds every-
thing together so that the random numbers are canceled out. It can then decrypt
the result using the sum of the shared secret keys. This scheme can be extended
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to N parties easily, in which case the sharing of random numbers will be given by a
directed cycle graph of length N . Thus, for a scheme involving N parties, the number
of communications will be O(N).
In the next chapter, we discuss data querying techniques in the smart grid. We
also construct a keyword data querying technique based on the Homomorphic Query
Processing Scheme that was introduced in Chapter 5. We also use the principles of
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) and Multi-Key Homomorphic
Encryption to construct this method. This scheme can be used in combination with
any of the data encryption techniques discussed in this chapter making smart meter
data encrypted as well as queryable.
Chapter 7
Query Processing in the Smart
Grid
All of the aforementioned techniques that use homomorphic encryption in the smart
grid focus on securing data aggregation. Although there is a substantial amount
of literature on data protection and encryption in the smart grid, there are very
few studies on querying encrypted data. The need for more research in this area
has been emphasized by the cybersecurity working group in the NIST Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel in their Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity [2]. Alongside
protecting data privacy through cryptographic countermeasures, when using smart
meter data for decision making and price predicting, it is critical that the encrypted
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data is queried in encrypted form. Therefore, designing encrypted data querying
techniques for the smart grid is essential while preserving the formal security goals
(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability). In this manner, utility companies can
extract data based on their individual needs.
In this chapter, we look at existing techniques for querying encrypted data and use
our Homomorphic Query Processing method in conjunction with a keyword search
technique proposed by Boneh [10] to propose a new method for keyword searching
in the smart grid. Smart meter data is usually collected by service providers for
statistical purposes such as computing the total consumption function, as explained
in Chapter 6. Our keyword search technique will help categorize smart meter data
prior to their use.
7.1 Encrypted Data Querying Techniques
The problem of querying over encrypted data has been extensively studied by cryp-
tographic and database communities [28]. There are several techniques available,
depending on the type of query and the type of data that need to be supported. We
give a summary of some of these proposed techniques.
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7.2 Order-Preserving Encryption
Ideally, we want a cryptographic scheme that allows comparison-predicate evaluation
over encrypted data. That is, an efficient scheme that can evaluate comparison oper-
ators such as “less than” (<), “greater than” (>), and “equality ” (=) over encrypted
data. The first order-preserving encryption scheme was introduced by Agrawal et
al [4]. This scheme allows the execution of range queries over encrypted data as
well as maintain indexes for efficient access. However, Agrawal’s scheme only works
for numeric data. A more efficient, order preserving encryption scheme was found by
Boldyreva et al. [8]; they also provided a security analysis of Agrawal’s scheme. In ad-
dition, Boldyreva’s analysis suggests that the disadvantage of using order-preserving
schemes is that they need to be deterministic. That is, all encryptions of a given
plaintext are identical. This makes order-preserving schemes susceptible to statistical
attacks.
7.3 Searchable Encryption Techniques
As its name suggests, “searchable encryption” techniques have the ability to search
or categorize encrypted data. The first searchable encryption scheme was introduced
by Boneh et al [9]. This scheme is commonly known as “Public Key Encryption with
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Keyword Search” (PEKS), and it can support the equality query over encrypted data
restricted to a particular collection of keywords. Then Golle et al. [24] proposed a
scheme that supports conjunctive keyword search over encrypted data. Furthermore,
Shi et al. [44] proposed an encryption scheme that supports multidimensional range
queries over encrypted data (MRQED). This technique uses an interval tree data
structure to construct a representation of intervals along each dimension. The authors
show that the time complexity of the MRQED scheme is O(D log T ), where D is the
number of dimensions, and T is the number of discrete values for each dimension.
7.4 Keyword Search in the Smart Grid
In Chapter 6, we discussed several proposed approaches to aggregate data in the
smart grid. Although these methods provide novel techniques to calculate the total
consumption, utility providers oftentimes require the ability to categorize data before
doing any calculation. Most energy providers have customer categories, and each
category has different tariff rates. For example, BC Hydro, the main energy provider
in British Columbia, has two customer categories, Residential customers and Business
customers, where business customers are sub-categorized into Small General Service
customers, Medium General Service customers, and Large General Service customers.
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In addition, both residential and business customers are categorized into Irrigation
Rate and Transmission Rate customers depending on their needs and consumption
habits. Each of these categories have different tariff rates; thus, as a utility provider,
it is essential that, for example, the smart meter data sent from a residential customer
is handled differently than the smart meter data sent from a business customer.
We propose a new method to categorize smart meter data based on a collection
of keywords. This method works alongside the aggregation protocols discussed in
Chapter 6, allowing the utility provider the ability to categorize smart meter data
before computing total consumption for each category. We demonstrate this concept
in the following example. Considering the customer categories of BC Hydro, let us
assume the set of keywords is {residence, smallbusiness, mediumbusiness, largebusi-
ness, irrigation, transmission}. We encrypt each of these keywords with a multi-key
homomorphic encryption scheme and send them to the utility provider, along with the
smart meter data encrypted by a suitable scheme. The utility provider will be able
to search the encrypted keywords, and would be able to know whether a particular
keyword of his choice is included in the keyword set or not. We employ several ideas
in constructing this method: our Homomorphic Query Protocol proposed in Chapter
5, Boneh’s Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) scheme [9], and the
multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Lo´pez-Alt et al. [33].
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First, we take a closer look at Boneh’s PEKS scheme [9].
7.4.1 Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS)
The PEKS scheme was initially introduced as a mechanism to search encrypted data
for specific keywords. The following example, as well as the definitions accompany it,
are taken from [9].
Suppose a user (Alice) wants to read her email on different devices: her laptop,
desktop, pager, etc. Alice’s email server will route the email to the appropriate device
based on certain keywords that the email contain. For example, if Bob sends an email
with the keyword “urgent,” the email is routed to Alice’s pager, and when Bob sends
an email with the keyword “lunch,” it will be routed to Alice’s desktop. Each email
is expected to contain a small number of keywords in the header or subject line. The
Mobile People Architecture [34] provides a prototype of this type of email routing.
However, the above scheme is only possible if the emails are not encrypted. The
mail server will have to make decisions according to the keywords that it sees, and if
the emails are encrypted, this is not possible. In email as well as other communica-
tion networks (such as the smart grid), this ability to process unencrypted data is a
violation of privacy. The goal of PEKS is to solve this issue by enabling the server to
check whether certain keyword(s) are contained in the data without learning anything
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about the data itself. In the above example, Alice should be able to specify some
keywords that the mail server will check in the mail it receives; however, the server
should not learn anything about the content of the messages nor the keywords they
contain.
We begin by defining the Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS)
scheme, similar to [9]. For the purpose of explanation, suppose Bob wants to send
an email to Alice with the keywords W1,W2, . . . ,Wk. Bob encrypts the email using
Alice’s public key. Bob sends the following message:
[Epk(M),PEKS(pk,W1), . . . ,PEKS(pk,Wk)] ,
where pk is Alice’s public key, M is the email body, and PEKS is the encryption
scheme that allows searching of specific keywords. More details of the PEKS algorithm
is given in Definition 7.1-7.2. The goal of this scheme is to allow Alice to send a
secret trapdoor, TW , to the server, which enables the server to check whether Bob’s
message contains the keyword W or not. The server should only learn whether W is
contained in Bob’s message and nothing else. The server can check for all such emails
that contain the keyword W and send them back to Alice. This kind of scheme is
called a “non-interactive public key encryption with keyword search” or in shorthand,
a “searchable public key encryption” scheme. Note that in this protocol, Alice and
Bob never interact with each other, hence the term “non-interactive” is used.
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Definition 7.1 A non-interactive public key encryption with keyword search (some-
times abbreviated it as “searchable encryption”) scheme consists of the following
polynomial time randomized algorithms:
1. KeyGen(s): Takes a security parameter, s, and generates a public/private key
pair pk, sk.
2. PEKS(pk,W ): For a public key pk and a word W , a searchable encryption of
W is produced.
3. Trapdoor(sk,W ): Given Alice’s private key and a word W a trapdoor TW is
produced.
4. Test(pk, S, TW ): Given Alice’s public key, a searchable encryption S = PEKS(pk,W0),
and a trapdoor TW = Trapdoor(sk,W ), the output is “yes” if W = W0 and
“no” otherwise.
First, Alice runs the KeyGen algorithm and generates her public and private keys,
pk and sk, respectively. Then, she creates the trapdoor TW for each keyword W that
she wants the server to search for. The server uses the trapdoor TW as input to the
test algorithm to determine if the message contains W as a keyword.
The security of the PEKS scheme is defined as follows. All the PEKS(pk,W )
values should not reveal any information about W unless TW is available. Also, it is
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assumed that the attacker is able to obtain TW for any W of his choice. Furthermore,
the attacker should not be able to distinguish an encryption of W0 from W1 for which
he did not obtain the trapdoor. Let A be an active attacker. Then the security of
the PEKS scheme is defined by the following game between A and a challenger. The
security parameter s is provided to both the attacker and the challenger.
Definition 7.2 PEKS Security Game:
1. The challenger runs the KeyGen(s) algorithm to generate pk and sk. It assigns
pk to the attacker.
2. The attacker can adaptively ask the challenger for the trapdoor TW for any
keyword W ∈ {0, 1}∗ of his choice.
3. At some point, the attacker A sends the challenger two words W0,W1 on which
he wishes to be challenged. The only restriction is that the attacker did not
previously ask for the trapdoors TW0 or TW1 . The challenger picks a random
b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the attacker C = PEKS(pk,Wb). We refer to C as the
challenge PEKS.
4. The attacker can continue to ask for trapdoors TW for any keyword W of his
choice as long as W ̸= W0,W1.
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5. Eventually, the attacker A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b′.
In summary, the attacker wins the security challenge if he correctly guesses whether
he was given the PEKS for W0 or W1. The attacker’s advantage in breaking the
PEKS is given by,
AdvA(s) =
⏐⏐⏐⏐Pr[b = b′]− 12
⏐⏐⏐⏐ .
We propose a new method of processing queries with respect to keywords in the
smart grid using this PEKS scheme along with the notion of multi-key fully homo-
morphic encryption proposed by Lo´pez-Alt et al [33]. In the next section, we give a
brief introduction to multi-key fully homomorphic encryption.
7.4.2 Multi-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fully homomorphic encryption schemes such as Gentry’s original lattice based con-
struction [23] and Braserski’s ring-based construction [12] successfully outsource com-
putations while keeping the data encrypted. However, these fully homomorphic en-
cryption schemes focus on a single user. That is, if Alice wants to upload her data
to a remote server, she can encrypt her data using a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme before uploading so that the server can perform computations. However, the
server can compute on these encrypted data only if all the data uploaded by Alice is
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encrypted via a single key. This is exactly what we want in a scenario where compu-
tations involve the data of a single user, but there are scenarios where computations
should be carried out on data belonging to multiple users. A perfect example of this is
the smart grid. Each user will upload data encrypted by their private key, and ideally
we want the server to compute functions on these encrypted data without decrypting
them. Furthermore, the server should be able to independently carry out the function
of its choosing without consulting the users (non-interactively), and the result should
be encrypted. Finally, in the decryption phase, the users who collaborated in the
encryption will interact with the server to perform the decryption. This is what we
hope to achieve by a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
In the next section, we outline the multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme
proposed by Lo´pez-Alt et al. [33], which is derived from the modified NTRU encryp-
tion scheme [46].
Definition 7.3 Modified NTRU Encryption Scheme: This scheme was derived from
the original NTRU encryption scheme by Hoffstein et al [27]. The scheme is parametrized
by the ring R = Z/ ⟨xn + 1⟩, where n is a power of two, q is an odd prime number,
and X is a B-bounded distribution over R for B ≤ q. Here “B-bounded” means that
the magnitude of the coefficients of a polynomial sampled from X is less than B.
Also, we define Rq = R/qR and use [ . ]q to denote coefficient-wise reduction modulo
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q into the set {− ⌊ q
2
⌋
, . . . ,
⌊
q
2
⌋}. The scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Keygen: Key generation samples “small” polynomials f ′, g ← X and sets
f = 2f ′ + 1 such that f(mod 2) = 1. If f is not invertible in Rq, it resamples
f ′. Otherwise, it computes the inverse f−1 of f in Rq and sets,
sk = f and pk =
[
2gf−1
]
q
,
where sk and pk stand for secret key and public key, respectively.
• Enc(m, pk): To encrypt a bit m ∈ {0, 1}, the encryption algorithm samples
“small” polynomials s, e← X , and outputs the ciphertext,
c = [hs+ 2e+m]q ,
where h = pk.
• Dec(c, sk): To decrypt a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm computes µ =
[fc]q and returns µ(mod 2).
The correctness of this scheme is verified by observing that,
[fc]q = [fhs+ 2fe+ fm]q
= [2gs+ 2fe+ fm]q .
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Note that since the elements g, s, f, and e are sampled from the B-bounded distri-
bution, and B ≤ q, the magnitude of the coefficients in 2gs + 2fe + fm are less
then q/2 and hence there is no reduction modulo q. That is, [2gs+ 2fe+ fm]q =
2gs+ 2fe+ fm. Therefore, µ = 2gs+ 2fe+ fm, which implies that µ(mod 2) = m
since f(mod 2) = 1.
In the following section, we give a brief summary of the multi-key homomorphic
properties of this scheme.
Let c1 = [h1s1 + 2e1 +m1]q and c2 = [h2s2 + 2e2 +m2]q be ciphertexts under the
keys h1 =
[
2g1f
−1
1
]
q
and h2 =
[
2g2f
−1
2
]
q
, respectively. Then [c1 + c2]q and [c1c2]q
decrypts to m1 +m2 and m1m2, respectively, under the joint key f1f2, as follows:
f1f2 (c1 + c2) = 2(f1f2e1 + f1f2e2 + f2g1s1 + f1g2s2) + f1f2(m1 +m2)
= 2eadd + f1f2(m1 +m2),
where eadd = f1f2e1+ f1f2e2+ f2g1s1+ f1g2s2 is the noise of the resulting ciphertext.
Similarly,
f1f2(c1c2) = 2(2g1g2s1s2 + g1s1f2(2e2 +m2) + g2s2f1(2e1 +m1) +
f1f2(e1m2 + e2m1 + 2e1e2)) + f1f2(m1m2)
= 2emult + f1f2(m1m2),
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where emult = 2g1g2s1s2+g1s1f2(2e2+m2)+g2s2f1(2e1+m1)+f1f2(e1m2+e2m1+2e1e2)
is the noise of the resulting ciphertext. Therefore, the ciphertexts [c1 + c2]q and [c1c2]q
decrypt to m1 + m2 and m1m2 as long as the noise elements eadd and emult do not
become too large. This scheme can be made fully homomorphic using Gentry’s boot-
strapping technique and is thus able to evaluate any Boolean circuit. After evaluating
the required circuit at the server, the parties involved in the encryption collaborate
to run a secure multi-party computation protocol to evaluate the decryption circuit.
For further details about this scheme we refer to [33].
Now we will see how the PEKS scheme and the multi-key homomorphic encryption
scheme can be used with the Homomorphic Query Processing method to evaluate
database queries.
7.5 Query Processing Scheme for Smart Grid
In this section, we describe how the PEKS scheme (Section 7.4.1) can be used to
construct a model that allows query processing of keywords in the smart grid. For
this task, we use the Homomorphic Query Processing method that we introduced in
section 5.3, along with the multi-key homomorphic encryption scheme mentioned in
section 7.4.2.
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Ideally, the server/utility company will want to categorize smart meter data into
sections according to various characteristics. For example, querying and separating
data by user type (i.e., household, business etc.), or by users that belong to different
payment plans, might be some examples where this might be useful. In this scheme,
the smart meters send their meter readings appended by a collection of keywords.
Suppose the number of smart meters communicating with the utility provider is n
and denote these smart meters by SM1, . . . , SMn. Furthermore, the readings of the
smart meters are m1,m2, . . . ,mn, respectively.
• The smart meter readings m1,m2, . . . ,mn will be encrypted by a suitable en-
cryption scheme, as discussed in section 6.2.1. The choice of this encryption
depends on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the methods discussed
and the given smart grid requirements. We denote these encrypted values by
E(m1), . . . , E(mn), where the encryption keys are the relevant public keys of
the smart meters.
• The keywords are encrypted by a multi-key homomorphic encryption scheme
(such as 7.3) and appended to E(m1), . . . , E(mn), respectively. Let us denote
the keywords belonging to smart meter i by Ki1, . . . , K
i
m and the encryptions of
these values by MKHhi(K
i
1), . . . ,MKHhi(K
i
m), where hi denotes the public key
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of SMi. Then, each smart meter sends the following data blocks to the server:
SM1 : [E(m1),MKHh1(K
1
1), . . . ,MKHh1(K
1
m)]
SM2 : [E(m2),MKHh2(K
2
1), . . . ,MKHh2(K
2
m)]
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
SMn : [E(mn),MKHhn(K
n
1 ), . . . ,MKHhn(K
n
m)]
• The server will query the data sent by the smart meters and see whether they
contain certain keywords. Suppose the server wants to search the data sent by
SMi for the keyword K. The server can use the same general principle of our
Homomorphic Query Processing method (equation 5.1) to check which keyword
matches K.
Let g and h be the secret key and the public key of the server, respectively, and
gi and let hi be the secret key and public key of SMi, respectively. Define,
Pj =
∏
Kl ̸=Kj
MKHh(K)−MKHhi(Kl)
and
Qj =
∏
Kl ̸=Kj
MKHhi(Ki)−MKHhi(Kl),
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where MKHx(m) denotes thatm is encrypted under the multi-key homomorphic
encryption scheme with public key x. Also, let m be the number of keywords
sent by SMi. Notice that the combined decryption key of the Pj is (ggi)
m−1 since
P involves a product ofm−1 ciphertexts, each with decryption key ggi, whereas
the combined decryption key of the Qj is g
2(m−1)
i since Q involves a product of
m−1 ciphertexts, each with decryption key g2i . The server can calculate Pj and
Qj given all the encrypted keywords sent by the user. However, the server is
unable to decrypt the results because it does not have the combined decryption
keys.
• Finally the smart meter (SMi) and the server collaborate to compute Fi, defined
as follows:
Fj =
Pj
Qj
=
∏
Kl ̸=Kj MKHh(K)−MKHhi(Kl)∏
Kl ̸=Kj MKHhi(Ki)−MKHhi(Kl)
The numerator (Pj) and denominator (Qj) calculated in the preceding step by
the server are sent to SMi, where they are multiplied by g
m−1
i and g
2(m−1)
i ,
respectively. Then, these values are sent back to the server securely, where the
server can multiply Pj with its part of the secret key, g
m−1. Hence the server
will have both Pj and Qj in plaintext and can calculate Fj by taking the division
of the two results. This would result in a table of Fj values similar to Table
5.1, except the fact that each value is in plaintext. For example, if K matches
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the 5th, keyword F5 would be equal to 1, whereas all the other Fj values would
be zero. Hence, the server would know whether the keyword is contained in the
data sent by SMi. This process is repeated for each smart meter.
This scheme has the advantage that homomorphic encryption is only used in the
querying and keyword encrypting processes, thereby reducing the computational over-
head. In the next chapter, we assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of these
protocols, the challenges in implementing them, and future research directions.
Remark:
It should be noted that we can use our Homomorphic Query Processing method
(section 5.3) with Boneh’s PEKS scheme (section 7.4.1) to propose an alternative
approach to keyword search in emails. Recall that Boneh’s scheme applies to the case
where two users, Alice and Bob, wish to communicate with each other through email.
Bob sends an email to Alice, who would like to route the email to the appropriate
device depending on the keywords it contain. Alice achieves this by sending a trapdoor
function to the server, enabling the server to search for a particular keyword. In
place of the trapdoor function, Alice can send the keyword (say K) that she wishes
to search, encrypted by Bob’s public key. If we use Braserski’s encryption scheme
7.5 Query Processing Scheme for Smart Grid 85
in encrypting all the keywords, the server can use the keywords sent by Bob, along
with the encrypted keyword sent by Alice, to compute Fi values for each keyword
(in other words, compare K with each keyword) using equation 5.1. The server can
then collaborate with Alice to decrypt the result, which will indicate whether K is
contained in the set of keywords.
Chapter 8
Challenges and Future Research
Directions of the Smart Grid
Most of the implementation challenges faced by the smart grid today boils down
to three main categories: hardware limitations, cryptographic protocols, and signal
processing. In this section, we examine each of these challenges and show how the
previously discussed protocols fall into these categories.
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8.1 Hardware Limitation Challenges
One of the most essential elements of a smart grid is its scalability. Most smart grids
consist of tens of thousands of consumers and the cryptographic protocols that are
used should be scalable to this size. For example, Garcia/Jacob’s protocol [21] and
Kursawe’s [31] approach employ a quadratic complexity of communication for the
aggregator (the number of messages that should be exchanged for N smart meters is
O(N2)) and a linear complexity for each smart meter (since each smart meter should
distribute O(N) number of messages). In comparison, Erkin/Tsudik’s protocol [16]
and A´cs/Castellucia’s protocol [3] have a linear communication complexity for the
aggregator and constant complexity for the smart meters. Hence, it is more desirable
to use the latter two protocols in terms of their scalability.
From the point of view of the grid operators, smart meters should be cheap and eas-
ily replaceable. Therefore, most smart meters used today have limited computational
power that is insufficient to carry out complex homomorphic encryption schemes. For
example, the Open Smart Grid Protocol and the smart metering protocols used in
the Netherlands employ symmetric encryption schemes such as RC4 and DES [18,30].
Although weaknesses in these protocols have been reported (see [32]), they remain in
use due to their high usability.
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8.2 Cryptographic Protocol Challenges
Almost all the protocols presented here are designed with the assumption in mind
that consumers and smart meters are not malicious. However, the real-world situation
is quite different. Apart from the privacy concerns associated with consumer data,
there is also a possibility that users might act maliciously to alter or sabotage the
correct behavior of smart meters. Although challenges that are faced by tampering
smart meters have been discussed in [1,35], there appears to be a lack of research on
protocols that achieve both the privacy goals related to aggregation of measurements
as well as smart meter tamper proofness.
Another challenge faced in aggregation protocols is that every participant should
use the same key in order for the measurements to be homomorphically combinable.
Most well known homomorphic encryption schemes work in this manner. For example,
the same public and private keys should be used in Erkin and Tsudik’s protocol [16]
for Pallier encryption scheme to work in the desired manner. This creates a problem
in terms of key distribution: If one party is malicious or compromised, there is a risk
of exposing the private keys used by all the other parties and the aggregator. One
measure towards resolving this problem is to use encryption schemes such as the one
used by A´cs and Castelluccia [3], where each pair of parties uses their own secret
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key. However, these schemes have a high communication overhead due to the huge
amount of key distribution.
Most cryptographic protocols depreciate due to increasing processing power and
newer attacking algorithms. Therefore, it is necessary that the devices that are con-
nected to the smart grid should have some secure means of upgrading their crypto
algorithms. In the case of fully fledged computers, this is quite easy to implement, for
example, through a software or driver update. Similarly, smart grid devices should
be designed with future upgrades to crypto algorithms in mind.
8.3 Future Research Directions
It is evident that the consequences of smart grid cybersecurity can be quite significant.
Deploying a smart grid without proper security mechanisms in place would result in
utility fraud, loss of user consumption data etc. One of the most critical issues of
smart grid cybersecurity is the problem of key distribution. The simplest method
is to use a single key that is shared by all the users of the smart grid. However,
this approach has the potential to fail catastrophically because a breach at a single
node will compromise the security of the entire grid. The main challenges associated
with the smart grid are due to its stringent security requirements and limited com-
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putational resources. Although many Cryptographic solutions have been proposed
both by academia and industry, most of these involve an unrealistic communication
overhead for smart devices with limited computational power.
In this work, we have discussed several proposed methods to aggregate smart me-
ter measurements using homomorphic encryption. The first approach by Garcia and
Jacobs [21] uses the concept of secret sharing to break each smart meter reading into
several parts and to distribute these parts among other participants. However, the
number of homomorphic encryptions of this protocol grows quadratically with the
number of smart meters, making it unsuitable for large-scale smart grids. On the
other hand, Kursawe’s [31] approach using the Diffie Hellman key exchange protocol
reduces the number of homomorphic encryptions at the cost of introducing a large
communication overhead. The third approach by Erkin and Tsudik [16] solves both
of these problems, but it assumes the smart meters are capable of performing several
computationally expensive cryptographic schemes (i.e., Paillier encryption, a hash
function, and random number generation). The final protocol proposed by A´cs and
Castelluccia [3] introduces a lightweight additive homomorphic cryptosystem that
mitigates the problems associated with secret sharing and computationally intensive
cryptosystems like Paillier. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, the best scheme
currently available for secret aggregation is A´cs and Castellucia’s scheme. However,
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further research has to be carried out especially in order to determine how the ran-
dom values between the smart meters (r1, r2 and r3 in Figure 6.7) can be securely
distributed.
8.3.1 Improvements to Homomorphic Query Processing
In addition to these challenges that are inherently present in the smart grid, there is
also room for improvement in our proposed methods: the Homomorphic Query Pro-
cessing (section 5.3) and the encrypted keyword technique in the smart grid (section
7.5). The Homomorphic Query Processing method uses plaintext inverses to calculate
the value of Fi in equation 5.1, essentially requiring the plaintext space in the fully
homomorphic encryption scheme to be a field. It would be a major improvement if our
scheme could be made independent of plaintext inverses, thus providing more flexibil-
ity to the user in choosing the plaintext space. One of the approaches that can be used
to construct an alternative method to calculate Fi is to use homomorphic subtraction
of the two multiplicands of equation 5.1. For example, Enc(a)−Enc(b) = Enc(a− b)
will be equal to an encryption of zero if a and b are equal and an encryption of
some other value if not. We believe this idea can be developed further to create an
alternative to our proposed method.
In addition, a next logical step is to improve this method to process conjunctive
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queries, which involve comparison of two or more values of the table simultaneously.
A typical solution to this problem is to compare each individual predicate of the
conjunct separately, but this has efficiency drawbacks.
Finally it would be interesting to look at avenues in which our homomorphic query
processing scheme can be implemented, so as to obtain experimental results.
8.3.2 Query Processing in the Smart Grid
In this thesis, we have investigated the problem of querying encrypted data in the
smart grid. We have proposed a method using PEKS [9] and multi-key homomorphic
encryption [33] to tackle this problem. The amount of research done in the area of
multi-key homomorphic encryption schemes seems to be quite limited, and to our
knowledge, the only multi-key encryption scheme currently available is the one intro-
duced by Lo´pez-Alt et al. [33] (section 7.4.2). Thus, it will be a major improvement
if our query processing method can be extended to any fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme. In addition, users will typically want to perform multi-keyword search
queries with logical operations such as AND, OR and NOT; therefore, the question
of providing more query functionality that supports these operations is also an open
area of research.
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